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Revolutionary Change in Local
Governance: Revisitingthe Rosenbaumand
KammererTheory of SuccessfulCity-County
Consolidation
Linda S. Johnson
Florida State University
Richard C. Feiock
Florida State University
Thispaper reevaluates Rosenbaum and Kammerer '.sframework of consolidation as revolutionary change. We examine their model as
app li ed to nine consolidation
attempts in the U.S . and
Can ada , with special emphasis on the 19 73 and 1992
cons olidation efforts in Tallahassee , Florida . Our examinati on of the nine consolidation
attempts by referenda
conf irm Rosenbaum and Kammerer 's thesis , but also sug gests the importance of professional
campaigns for and
agai ns t consolidation
and the role of elites as "consoli dati on entrepreneurs ."
Any major overhauling of local government structure
in a particular metropolitan area is likely to involve
damage to some existing interests .... Those adversely
affected can often enlist support from others who
merely fear the uncertainty of change, or who instinctively prefer known evils to unknown possible
problems.. .. [A]ny particular reorganization plan
must compete for favor with not only the status quo
but also with possible alternative kinds of change.
(National Commission on Urban Problems 1968,
335) .

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the American
Society for Public Administration, Orlando Florida, April 1999. We would like to thank
Russell Hellein of Florida State, Jered Carr of The College of Charleston , the editor of
this jou rnal, and an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments and suggestions.
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onsolidation of city and county governments is a radical,
even revolutionary change in local governance (Rosenbaum and Kammerer 1974). A successful consolidation
outcome is also a rare event with only nineteen consolidation
successes since World War II (Feiock and Carr 1999). Vincent
Marando (1979, 411) noted that between 1959 and 1976 only 11
of the 68 consolidation referenda attempts were successful, a
success rate of only 25%. Walter Rosenbaum and Gladys Kammerer (1974) concluded the probability of success in consolidation through a local referendum was so small that success was
"against long odds." Their model of successful consolidation is
essentially a theory of the conditions necessary for revolutionary
change.
This article reevaluates Rosenbaum and Kammerer 's
framework and finds considerable merit in the original theory of
consolidation as revolutionary change. In the following sections,
we present an overview of government reorganization and a review of the Rosenbaum and Kammerer model. We then critically
evaluate an application of the Rosenbaum and Kammerer model
to nine consolidation attempts in the U.S. and Canada and discuss the implications of the Rosenbaum and Kammerer model
for consolidation efforts in Tallahassee, Florida, in 1973 and
1992. Our examinations of nine consolidation attempts by referenda, including the two in Tallahassee, confirm Rosenbaum and
Kammerer's thesis, but also suggest the importance of professional campaigns for and against consolidation and the role of
elites as "consolidation entrepreneurs." In conclusion, we discuss
the implications of our analysis for the practice and study of
government reorganization.
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DEMAND FOR CHANGE IN
LOCAL GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE

In 1963, Roscoe Martin noted that the concept of the
"city" was changing and pronounced the dawning of a new age
of the "metropolis ." Not only had metropolitan areas increased in
size, but the number and complexity of urban problems had increased .
One means local governments use to adapt to the
changing needs of the citizens is through change in governance
structures. The desire of local citizens for change extend s from
"criti cal problems arising from the frustrations of city life and
the failure of city governments to cope with many of the elementary problems of everyday living" (Bish and Ostrom 1973,
3). These problems affect all the citizens of the local area: garbage removal , crime , education , transportation , adequate water
and sewage , and police and fire protection. Bish and Ostrom
cont end that demands for institutional change can be manifestations of citizens ' perceptions that· they are paying too much for
the services they are receiving .
City-county consolidation is the structural device advocated by the National Commission on Urban Problems as a
means to decrease the problem of small , overlapping, and duplicating local governments (NCUP 1968). According to the NCUP,
fragm entation has negative consequences for local government
beca use (1) small governmental units cannot provide effective or
economical solutions to community problems ; (2) overlapping
governmental layers create waste and confusion for citizens ; (3)
popular control of local government is ineffective because of
complex ballots and multiple layers of governance ; (4) leadership in policy making is ineffective or absent ; (5) administrative
VOL. 271999
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agencies are archaic and inadequate to the "functional demands
placed upon them "; and (6) local governments are not able to
attract or retain professional , highly qualified personnel (NCUP
1968, 326).
Reformers may seek the radical change that reorganization of local governance will bring , but citizens may be hesitant
to embrace radical reorganization because they identify with the
local area through the existing public institutions and their associated symbols (Rosenbaum and Kammerer, 1974). On the other
hand, Marando (1979) argues that though few consolidation attempts have been successful , the process of attempted reform can
have positive side effects:
Consolidation of city and county by referendum is a
form of reorganization which potentially can affect a
wide range of governance and service delivery issues .
In one grand gesture a great deal can be accomplished: charter reform, modernization, reduction of
elected positions to simplify the ballot, the weakening of localized special interests through the dissolution of their local governments or special districts,
county home rule , citizen civic education, a more orderly administrative structure , a mobilized civic association , and direct assessment of citizens ' will
through referendum (Marando 1979, 410) .
THE ROSENBAUM AND KAMMERER MODEL

Rosenbaum and Kammerer (1974) focus on radical
"comprehensive consolidation " of city and county governments
through a local referendum. They postulate that radical change
occurs through revolution following the pattern described by
scholars of political revolution , particularly Chalmers Johnson's
1966 book Revolutionary Change.
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Rosenbaum and Kammerer explore the configuration of
attributes present in the local community that lead to a successful
consolidation campaign. They conclude that" ... successful consolidation is imbedded in a number of important social, economic, and political transformations in a community and this
chain of events is essential to the campaign 's success" (Rosenbaum and Kammerer 1974, 21). Their framework proceeds in a
"complex set of events" or stages with the outcome as a consolidation referendum . Stage I is classified as "Crisis Climate ,"
Stage II as "Power Deflation," and Stage III as "The Accelerator
Event."
Stage I: Crisis Climate . Stage I begins the process with
a crisis climate , an onset of one or more civic problems (Rosenbaum and Kammerer 1974, 21) . Rosenbaum and Kammerer descri b e the crisis climate as proceeding in three phases:
(1) environmental changing events , (2) demands from citizens
for governmental response, and (3) an inappropriate response by
the government (Rosenbaum and Kammerer 1974, 21-24). Environm ental changing events can include changes in population ,
raci al and economic composition , services , appearance, or resources of core cities compared with fringe areas. The important
point is that citizens are aware that there are problems the local
government must address.
These changes can trigger demand for response from the
government that becomes phase two. For example, in response to
population changes the demand could be for annexation, better
transportation , or increased taxing of fringe areas. In the case of
shifts in racial composition, the demand could be for reapportionment of voting districts. The third phase , a crisis climate ,
occurs when government does not respond to citizens ' demands
or citizens deem the governmental response inadequate. Rosen -
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baum and Kammerer (1974) note three reasons for the inappropriate governmental response:
1. Intransigence: governmental failure to act with a
positive response or failure to recognize citizen demands as legitimate;
2. Conservatism: governmental response is viewed as
too little, too late by the citizens;
3. Impotence: governmental response may be handicapped by actions that are beyond its control, such as
defeat in a vote for action that could alleviate the
problem, i.e., defeat of a bond issue (Rosenbaum and
Kammerer 1974, 24).

The important factor in Stage One is that governmental
responses are chronically and publicly not appropriate to the citizens' increasing demands (Rosenbaum and Kammerer 1974, 24).
During phase one, the government can respond with action to
ameliorate the public demands. Action such as an innovative
policy or conservative reform could defuse the crisis climate.
However, if the governmental response is deemed by the citizenry as not appropriate to the situation, then the crisis continues
and culminates in a complete Stage I Crisis Climate.
Stage II: Power Deflation . Power deflation is an increasing loss of confidence in the legitimacy of local governmental structure by the community. The loss of confidence is
more than just the perception that there is a deficiency in services, it is a belief that there is a severe, deep-seated problem in
the governing structure: the " ... philosophical and structural
foundations of local government, the fundamentals of the system
itself ... " (Rosenbaum and Kammerer 1974, 25). Rosenbaum and
Kammerer stress the importance of two broad groups of actors at
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the power deflation stage, civic elites and the mass media. These
groups work through public disclosure of government failure and
promote consolidation as the design that will make the government more responsive . The civic elites are an important institutional force for change in the local community. In some cases,
Rosenbaum and Kammerer (1974, 27) see the civic elites' use of
local government restructuring as a means to diminish the power
of other influentials in the community, increase their activity in
the community, or become the "new guard" that ousts the "old
guard."
Community political leaders are an important part of the
community elite leadership. Sharon Krefetz and Alan Sharaf
(1977) suggest that the role of the political elites in consolidation
is critical to the outcome. Business elites may see economic gain
attached to administrative and political reform (Knott and Miller,
1987). Feiock and Carr (1999) have linked the presence of academic elites to entrepreneurship for city/county consolidation .
They argue entrpreneurial activities of public administration
scholars can provide the impetus for moving governmental reform or reorganization to the forefront of the public agenda
(Feiock and Carr, 1999).
The mass media is also important to the power deflation
stage since the media can shape citizens ' perceptions of local
government issues. Local radio , television , and newspapers not
only inform the public but also can shape public opinion:
... the greatest potential weight of media influence
can obviously be generated when the media adopt a
deliberate editorial policy toward existing governmental structures or proposals for their modification ...a power deflation might well be participated ,
or powerfully accelerated , if important communitymedia commit themselves to governmental reform
(Rosenbaum and Kammerer 1974, 27).
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Power deflation is manifested in several forms, including
the advent of ad hoc reform groups, elite demands for investigations of local officials and agencies, media criticism of the local
government, citizen or community group lawsuits against local
government personnel or agencies, or formation of local government reorganization study commissions.
Stage ill: The Accelerator Event. Rosenbaum and
Kammerer set the third and final stage for radical change with an
acceleration event. The accelerator event is a means by which
public support for consolidation is aggregated at the polls. An
event or events must throw the community into a "critical situation." The event could begin during the campaign for consolidation. They suggest four types of events that could act as
accelerators, events that may or may not be directly associated
with the consolidation effort:
1. a significant scandal involving a public official or
agency;
2 . an emergency in the community that accentuates
the failure of the present form of government ;
3. an important criticism of the government from a
distinguished outside source ;
4. the sudden loss of an influential leader who 1s
closely associated with the present form of government (Rosenbaum and Kammerer 1974, 29) .
THE MESSINGER MODEL

Boyd Messinger (1989) was the first to operationalize
Rosenbaum and Kammerer's framework for consolidation.
Based on case studies, he identified configurations of the presence or absence of each stage in consolidation using a template
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array. Eight cities and nine consolidation attempts were analyzed: Jacksonville/Duval County, Florida ; Tampa/Hillsborough
County, Florida ; Nashville/Davidson County, Tennessee (two
attempts) ; Miami/Dade County, Florida ; Metropolitan Toronto.
Canada; Indianapolis/Marion County, Indiana; and Virginia
Beach/Princess Anne County, Virginia . Messinger began with an
in-depth historical account of the area and the events that led to
each attempt. He placed each site in the template if it exhibited at
least one criterion posited by Rosenbaum and Kammerer. Messinger 's analysis of these consolidation attempts is discussed in
the following paragraphs.
Jacksonville and Tampa. Rosenbaum and Kammerer
provi de case studies of the Jacksonville and Tampa consolidation
attem pts . Both areas experienced
all of the environmental/ physical and demographic changes postulated to create a
crisis climate . The difference between the two cities was the response of the government and the ensuing call for change in the
community . Jacksonville 's government showed an incompetence
(or refusal) to handle the problems of race, schools , property assessments , infrastructure , water, and drainage plus the inability
to annex fringe areas. Tampa, on the other hand, was able to annex the fringe areas, appeared to have a more flexible government, was able to raise the revenue for education and
infrastructure through raising the property assessments , and had
a more competitive and representative political system . The consolidation initiatives in Jacksonville and Tampa also differed .
Community leaders and the Chamber of Commerce were the
initiators of reform proposals when the school system lost its
accreditation (a power deflator) , while in Tampa the legislative
delegation took the initiative to form a study commission without formal prompting from community leaders (Rosenbaum and
Kammerer 1974, 47-48) .
VOL.271999
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Power deflation was an important factor in the perceptions of government failure. In Jacksonville , the consolidation
fed on perceptions of deflated government power that were not
sustained in Tampa. While Rosenbaum and Kammerer contend
that Tampa exhibited one characteristic of power deflation , the
creation of a consolidation study commission , Messinger disagrees and interprets the formation of the study commission as
lacking the element of power deflation because the commission
was not created in response to a crisis climate.
Nashville/Davidson County. Nashville/Davidson Cotmty's
first consolidation attempt was not successful. The crisis climate
of inadequate services , social/economic inequities , lack of political representation , and unstructured growth was compounded by
the unresponsiveness of the local government (Messinger 1989).
A study commission was created , but there was no accelerator
event. Messinger also notes the lack of a professionally run proconsolidation campaign. However , a strong anti-merger campaign produced a failed consolidation effort. The second consolidation attempt saw an increase in the crisis problem and the
needed accelerators. A professionally run pro-consolidation
campaign proved enough to turn the tide .
Miami/Dade County. The Miami/Dade merger resulted
in a federation instead of a complete consolidation. Longstanding suspicions of corruption in the police force , inadequate
service , corporate criticism , and a political scandal at the county
level provided accelerators (Messinger 1989, 155-160) . Civic
organizations such as the League of Women Voters and business
interests like the Chamber of Commerce united in support for
merger.
Virginia Beach/Princess Anne County. Messinger also
considered the consolidation of Virginia Beach/Princess Anne
County. The Virginia consolidation is unique because there was
no crisis climate caused by the performance of the city (MessTHE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIEN CE
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inger 1989). Instead , an outside force produced the crisis. The
State of Virginia allowed cities to annex territory through court
proce edings rather than a referendum by citizens. The City of
Norf olk began annexing several square miles in Princess Anne
County and the City of Virginia Beach felt it needed to protect
this area and provide a means for its own future growth. The response of the local government was impotence (Messinger
1989). It was unable to stop the City of Norfolk. According to
Mess inger, the Virginia Beach case provides another expansion
of the Rosenbaum and Kammerer model: crisis may be external
rather than internal.
Indianapolis/Marion County and Toronto, Canada.
Mess inger attempted to apply the Rosenbaum and Kammerer
theory to explain consolidations imposed or mandated from the
state, rather than the referendum-based consolidation for which
the Rosenbaum and Kammerer model was intended . While
Mes singer includes in his study the Indianapolis/Marion County
and the Toronto consolidations , they are omitted from our analysis because they were not referendum mergers , but legislative
events.
Messinger 's final template is reproduced in Table 1.
Messinger found three patterns of consolidation that fit the cases
he examined: (1) Reform without Referendum , (2) Failed Reform Attempts with Referendum , and (3) Successful Reform
with Referendum. Messinger 's case analysis suggested the need
to add a Professional Consolidation Campaign Stage (Stage IV)
to the basic Rosenbaum and Kammerer model. He found that
successful referendum attempts had included a professional
campaign waged for consolidation. Campaign veterans and/or
publi c relations people staffed these campaigns. They also relied
on voter attitude surveys , recruited commitments from
civic/ community elites or organizations , and they were well enVOL. 271999
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TABLE 1
Messinger's Model
Crisis
Climate
Stage I

Location

1
Indianapolis
Toronto

X
X

Tampa
Nashville (1st)

X
X

Nashville (2nd)
Jacksonville
Miami
Lexington

X
X
X
X

Virginia Be2ch

X

Notes:

Power
Deflator
Stage II

Theory
Accelerator
Predict
Stage III Merge? Outcome?

I2 I3
Reform Without Referendum
X
X X
X X
X
Failed Reform with Referendum

*
X
X X
Successful Reform with Referendum
X X
X
X
X
X X
X
X
*
X X
X X
X
X
X

X

X

X

YES
YES

NO
NO

NO
NO

YES
YES

YES
YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES
YES

YES

YES

X = presence of the event or stage .
• = Even or stage present only if theory modified .
- = event or stage absent.

<lowedwith resources or they were targeted to popular support or
"grass-roots" members of the community (Messinger 1989).
Messinger suggested that "alienation," should be added
to phase 3: an inappropriate response of government. He found
that, sometimes, not only were the governmental responses not
present, too conservative, or weakened by other governmental
action, as Rosenbaum and Kammerer postulated, in some cases
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the responses alienated the citizens from the government (Messinger 1989, 35).
While Messinger provides a useful descriptive account
of the patterns identified by Rosenbaum and Kammerer, his work
does not provide a formal analysis of their model of a successful
consolidation through referendum. Messinger modified the Rosenbaum and Kammerer 's theory to incorporate less revolutionary, legislatively imposed change. We address this limitation
with in-depth case analyses of consolidation efforts in Tallahassee, Florida, and a comparative analysis of referenda-based consolidation efforts. Our comparative analysis systematically
evaluates nine referenda-based consolidation attempts in relation
to the Rosenbaum and Kammerer model.
TALLAHASSEE CONSOLIDATION ATTEMPTS

Tallahassee and Leon County, Florida have attempted
consolidation at least six times (Mastron 1986). The most recent
consolidation referendum was in 1992. In 1997, the issue was
addressed again, but deemed "too hot to handle" (Dickens 1997,
IA). Although the main issue in 1997 was whether to consolidate law enforcement departments, the subject of the city and
county consolidation was also discussed . In this debate, Dickens
(1997) noted that consolidation referenda in the county were defeated four times in the preceding 26 years.
Tallahassee 1953. Most authors cite Tallahassee's consolidation attempts beginning in 1971. However, Tallahassee
considered consolidation long before 1971. In September 1953,
the Governor of Florida appointed a Consolidation Study Commission (CSC) after an act of the Florida Legislature authorized
the appointment (Jackson, Flannery, and Bair 1955, 6). Future
consolidation attempts are built on this first experience in what
VOL.271999
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Douglass North (1990) would describe as a path dependent process.
Population growth and land available for the city have
been constant problems for the City. of Tallahassee. The CSC
noted that 21 % of the population of Leon County (12,202 people) lived in "the urban fringe" (Jackson, Flannery, and Bair
1955, 6). Service problems included sewage , street lighting, unpaved streets, storm water drainage, land use planning , fire protection , traffic, and safety (Jackson, Flannery, and Bair 1955, 810). Possible solutions to these service problems included annexation , a tactic that Tallahassee exercised frequently in its
history . Nevertheless , annexation was not a viable answer in
1953 since most properties were covered by homestead exemption and they had low assessed value. Consequently , incorporation or metropolitan tax districts were not acceptable solutions
(Jackson, Flannery, and Bair 1955, 9-10). The county lacked
funds to provide needed services to fringe areas. Contracting for
the services was not considered because of expressed fears that,
unlike water and sewage , setting prices for police and fire protection would be difficult or impossible (Jackson, Flannery, and
Bair 1955, 10).
The chapter of the CSC report on the reorganization of
the law enforcement functions of the city and county provides a
foreshadowing of future city and county law enforcement consolidation problems. The last sentence, set apart as its own paragraph reads: "Neither the present chief of Tallahassee police nor
the sheriff of Leon County see the need for or favor any form of
consolidation" (Jackson, Flannery, and Bair 1955, 100).
The final report recommendation of the CSC to the Governor was not to consolidate several governmental department s
at that time. Those departments were Law Enforcement, Road
Construction , and Tax Assessment and Collection (Jackson,
Flannery, and Bair 1955, 123). The commission did suggest that
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the county court house and the city hall be in the same building
or in adjacent buildings. These recommendations were never
acted upon.
Tallahassee 1973. Tallahassee held a consolidation referendum on November 2, 1971. The consolidation attempt failed
with an unofficial tally of the vote, reported the next day, of
14,740 against and 10,381 for consolidation (Sherer 1971). The
pro-c onsolidation group argued that the vote was a rejection of
the proposed charter and not a rejection of consolidated government (Sherer 1971, 8). The 1973 attempt began early in 1972
when the new mayor, James Ford , announced that the city commission would open discussions of consolidation (Boyles 1972).
Since the 1971 and 1973 efforts were separated by only five
months, our analysis concentrates on the 1973 consolidation attempt.
Many of the advantages for consolidation were tied to
the efficiency and economy of the consolidated government.
Paul Craig , an economist at Florida State University , noted that
the consolidation of police, fire protection , water and sewer,
sanitation, and recreation could provide "economy of scale"
benefi ts (Harbolt 1973). The difficult decision of how to select
the chief law enforcement officer was decided through a straw
poll of Leon County voters; the outcome favored an elected official (Tallahassee Democrat 1972).
Anti-consolidation forces were at work early in this consolidation effort, beginning with criticism of the way the consolidation charter was drafted. The anti-consolidation group
requested the state attorney to investigate possible abuse of the
Florida Sunshine Laws by the Charter Commission in drafting
the charter (Jolley 1973b). The group also claimed that the media
was engaged in a conspiracy to assure that the consolidation
passe d (Jolley 1973a).
VOL.
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The public hearing on the consolidation charter, held on
February 1, 1973, provides some insights into the heated battle
and the issues underlying the consolidation debate. For three
hours the debate continued. Fears raised in the session ranged
from concern that the nonpartisan elections would signal the
death of the Republican party in Leon County to questions as to
whether consolidation , in general, was opposed or supported or
whether the charter, in particular , was at issue (Spillan 1973).
The advantages and disadvantages of consolidated government were debated by two local attorneys: Elliott Messer,
chairman of Consolidation '73 and William Daniel , spokesman
for Tallahassee-Leon County Action Committee Opposing Consolidation (Tallahassee Democrat 1973). The case for consolidation was presented by Messer as an answer to governance and
accountability problems created by fragmentation of local government: inadequate streets, inadequate mass transit , and storm
water drainage problems . Daniels said that the current system of
government was working and consolidation would create "big
government" (Tallahassee Democrat 1973).
Storm water drainage is cited often in the 1973 consolidation debates along with concerns about how to choose the law
enforcement chief. Consolidation was also linked to better law
enforcement through the elimination of jurisdictional fragmentation, and by promoting the status and independence of the department (Carson 1973).
The campaign for consolidation was heated. The proconsolidation side provided the city/county employees with fliers
detailing the ways consolidation would save money through
eliminating duplication and waste . The Consolidation News, a
publication of the pro-consolidation group, noted the savings in
tax dollars and the benefits of planning to relieve traffic jams,
save Lake Jackson, and eliminate storm water run off. The News
also strongly supported the idea that the consolidation would
THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
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The formation of the consolidation study con11mss10n
demonstrates that the Stage II power deflator was present in
Tallahassee . An accelerator event did not seem present. Civic
elite demands for investigation of local officials and agencies
and lawsuits , possible accelerators , did occur ; however, the investigation and lawsuit were threatened against the study commission, and not against the city government.
A professional campaign was waged on both sides and,
in the end , the anti-consolidation campaign may have had more
clout. Two characteristics of Messinger 's Professional Campaign
Stage IV were apparent in the anti-consolidation campaign , but
did not seem present in the pro-merger campaign. First, the anticonsolidation group exploited the disadvantages of consolidation
and, second, the anti-consolidation advocates targeted their campaign to popular support or "grass-roots" members of the community (Messinger 1989). In this case, Rosenbaum and
Kammerer's theory correctly predicted the outcome.
Tallahassee 1992. Jack Schluckebier studied Tallahassee
and Leon County 's 1992 consolidation attempt for his dissertation in 1995. Schluckebier contends that Tallahassee, like
Augusta and Athens , Georgia , did not have the presence of a
Stage I Crisis Climate and therefore the Rosenbaum-Kammerer
Theory does not work for Tallahassee. We believe Schluckebier's rejection of the Rosenbaum and Kammerer framework
was unwarranted. We show the applicability of the Rosenbaum
and Kammerer theory through our analysis of the consolidation
attempt drawn from local newspaper accounts.
The public process of consolidation began late in January 1990 when the state representative supported by local business executives , builders, and neighborhood associations
introduced legislation in the Florida House of Representatives
for the Tallahassee/Leon merger. The consolidation effort would
require two votes from the public (Bruns 1990). The business
THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
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make government more responsive to the people and reduce tax
inequities in the county (Consolidation '73 Committee 1973). At
the polls on November 6, 1973, the voters defeated the consolidation attempt by a vote of 12,665 against and 10,907 in favor .
The defeat was blamed on low voter turnout (Harbolt 1973).
Application of the Rosembaum-Kammerer Model to
Tallahassee 1973. Our application of the Rosenbaum-Kammerer
model to the 1973 Tallahassee case will first proceed following
Messing er 's template. As Table 2 records, each phase of the crisis climate was present. Drainage , street repairs, traffic jams ,
police protection were visible ongoing problems. Demand for
governm ent response to these problems was present and had
been for a long time. The response from the government was
conserv ative . The city government tried to provide the services,
but the effort was viewed as "too little too late."

TABLE2
Template Array for Tallahassee 1973 and 1992
Crisis
Climate
Stage I

Location

1

Power
Deflator
Stage II

Theory
Accelerator
Predict
Stage III Merge? Outcome?

I2 I3

Failed Reform With Referendum
Talla hassee '73 X X X
X
Talla hassee '92 X X X
X
Notes:

NO
NO

YES
YES

X = presence of the event or stage.
• = Even or stage present only if theory modified .
- = event or stage absent.
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community, developers, and neighborhood associations represented interests that supported consolidation. They acted as consolidation entrepreneurs. Their first step was to introduce a bill
to form a consolidation committee by a popular vote; if the vote
was successful, then the committee would draw up a charter to
be presented to the Legislature and the citizens would vote on
the charter (Fineout 1990b). The proposal for the formation of a
charter committee passed by a margin of 57% to 43%.
The choice of partisan versus nonpartisan elections was
a contentious issue early in the process of forming the charter
(Fineout 1991d). Partisan or nonpartisan elections were a source
of contention in the consolidation debate from the early 1970s.
Margaret Leonard (1991b) noted that many aspects of the charter
required compromises. The list of opposing points of the charter
includes the following: an elected sheriff versus appointed sheriff, strong mayor versus weak mayor, an elected tax collector
versus an appointed tax collector, one government versus saving
jobs, utility revenue for the county versus Talquin Electric Coop, centralization versus decentralization of administrative services. Leonard notes that for each point in the charter and each
decision made by the commission, a new opposition group was
mobilized (Leonard 1991b).
The North Florida Chapter of the American Society for
Public Administration recommended consolidation. The Chapter's endorsement was based on five characteristics of the local
area: homogenous demographics, the "blurring" of infrastructure
responsibility due to increased growth and development, a decrease in the distinction between city and county service provision, adverse fiscal conditions for service provision in the county
government, and increased problems of county service provision
in :fragmented unincorporated county areas as future annexation
occurred by the city (NFC of ASPA 1991, 1).
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To satisfy the demands of neighborhoods, minority, and
rural citizens, the commission chose a system of district representation in which two of eight districts encompassed predominately black neighborhoods and one district encompassed
primarily rural areas (Leonard 1991a). One small, rural, unincorporated community south of Tallahassee, Woodville, opposed a
single rural district and an appointed sheriff (Fineout 1991c), a
sentiment also expressed by citizens in Miccosukee, a small unincorporated community close to the Jefferson county line (Fineout 1991a). Miccosukee residents viewed their area as "a
stepchild of Leon County" and believed that consolidation would
cost more and provide fewer services (Fineout 1991a). However,
a poll taken for the consolidation committee by the Oppenheim
Research Group in October 1991 showed a 2 to 1 margin of support for consolidation in the county (Fineout 1991b). The survey
of 861 Tallahassee citizens found that 48.1% favored consolidation, 26.4% opposed consolidation, and 25.6% were not sure
(Oppenheim Research 1991, 19).
In November 1991, a second element of a Stage II
Power Deflation occurred. A grand jury was convened to investigate the departments of Law Enforcement in Tallahassee/Leon
County and the consequences of consolidation (Peck 1991b).
The grand jury investigation was an extension of an earlier investigation (Peck 1991c). The jury 's findings were that jurisdictional competition, incompatible communication systems, and
significant duplication of services between the Leon County
Sheriff's Department and the Tallahassee Police Department cost
taxpayers an extra $1.2 million annually (Tallahassee Democrat
1991). The grand jury report stated that these deficiencies could
be corrected through merger (Tallahassee Democrat 1991; Peck
1991a).
Schluckebier (1995, 142-143) did not categorize the
grand jury report as either a failure of government or an accelTHE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
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erator event since the grand jury took no action. Schluckebier
states that convening the grand jury was simply one tactic employed by the pro-consolidation advocates in their campaign for
the adoption of the charter. We agree with Schluckebier that the
grand jury report was not an accelerator event, since the grand
jury found waste and inefficiencies from competition, but not
from fraud or illegal activities. Nevertheless, this finding clearly
is a Stage II power deflation challenging the legitimacy of the
exiting governance structure and empowering the proconsolidation efforts.
With the campaign in full swing for both the pro- and
anti-consolidation groups, two days before the referendum the
"Opinion" section of the Tallahassee Democrat provided opposing viewpoints on consolidation (Tallahassee Democrat
1992). A supporter of consolidation, Bernie Sliger, president of
Florida State University, listed the advantages of consolidation as
lower taxes and efficiency, a single law enforcement agency, accountability, new jobs due to a friendly business environment,
higher ethical standards in government, stronger growth management and environmental protection , better human services,
and home rule. Opposition to consolidation cited the expense of
big government and centralized control, lack of political accountability resulting from fewer elected offices, politicized law
enforcement, and greater inefficiencies (Tallahassee Democrat
1992).
The anti-consolidation efforts may have benefited from a
paid political advertisement by Leon County Sheriff Eddie
Boone that appeared in the Tallahassee Democrat two days before the referendum . Based on a 1991 manpower study, Boone
claimed that 54 extra city police officers would be required to
answer calls in the city that were currently answered by the
county sheriff 's department. The additional officers would cost
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the city more than $4 million the first year and almost $3 million
each additional year. The advertisement ended with a statement
that the sheriff 's department saved the taxpayers $1.7 million
annually (Tallahassee Democrat 1992).
On November 3, 1992, the voters of Leon County voted
to reject the charter for consolidation by a margin of 3 to 2
(Leonard 1992). Voters outside the city resoundingly rejected
consolidation. In addition, despite the effort to draw minority
districts , the African-American community opposed consolidation fearing it would lose its voice in the governing process
(Leonard 1992).
Application of Rosenbaum-Kammerer Model to Tallahassee 1992. In Tallahassee and Leon County, a crisis climate
had existed for some time. The climate included rapid population
growth and perceptions of lowered quality of services . Service
problems were evident in discussions of the quality of services to
rural areas and of monies needed by the county to provide those
services. The law enforcement problem presented a political turf
battle , but translated into a service problem in some areas.
Population in Tallahassee continued to grow rapidly and presented ongoing environmental and service problems . The 1990
reinstatement of the consolidation commission signaled a continuous question of whether the government was providing the
services demanded by citizens and the presence of a power deflation stage.
Civic and elite demand for investigations of local officials and agencies and the formation of local government study
commissions or committees to explore government restructure
were both present in the consolidation attempt. It is important to
note here that Rosenbaum and Kammerer suggest that elites
could be the " ... critical element in raising public disaffection
with local government to the place where the public is receptive
to consolidation" (Rosenbaum and Kammerer 1974, 26). The
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grand jury and the consolidation study commission are each
characteristic of power deflation. The power deflation process
described by Rosenbaum and Kammerer was clearly in place in
Tallahassee.
On the other hand, the accelerator was not present. There
was no unifying emergency, scandal, or event. In fact, there appears to have been no unifying elements in the attempt at all.
Two well-defined sides competed for diametrically opposed outcomes with each side entrenched in the struggle. When positioned in Messinger 's Template in Table 2, the 1992 attempt
appears to be like the 1973 effort. The actors and elements
change, but the pattern is still the same.
COMPARISON OF PATTERNS IN
CITY-COUNTY CONSOLIDATION REFERENDA

The two Tallahassee consolidation attempts can be used
to extend Messinger's research. The Template based on Messinger is presented in Table 3.
Table 3 includes seven of Messinger 's sites. Unlike
Messinger, we categorize Tampa as having the presence of a
power deflator. Our categorization is based on our interpretation
of Rosenbaum and Kammerer 's theory that the presence of a
consolidation committee signaled a power deflator. The other
difference between our model and Messinger 's model is the interpretation of an accelerating event in Miami. Messinger did not
think the acceleration stage was present in Miami. We interpret
the corporate criticism of the government structure and services,
and the scandal involving the county level government as a focusing and unifying stage for consolidation. Thus, the presence
of an accelerator for Miami was added to our basic model.
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A systematic application of the Rosenbaum and Kammerer theory proceeds by pattern matching the nine referenda
attempts (the seven used by Messinger and the two Tallahassee
attempts). We rely on the full Rosenbaum and Kammerer
framework with the addition of Messinger's professional campaign stage. Table 3 reveals a distinctive pattern match for citycounty consolidation attempts with a local referendum. The most

TABLE3
Consolidation Attempts Through Referenda With Presence or
Absence of Professional Campaign (Stage IV)
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obvious pattern in Tallahassee attempts in 1973 and 1992 is the
lack of an accelerator in the reform process . Tallahassee did not
appear to have any of the critical events or situations suggested
by Rosenbaum and Kammerer that could throw the entire community into support of reform government.
In each Tallahassee consolidation attempt , both the proconsolidation and the anti-consolidation groups ran professional
campaign s. Nashville , in its second attempt , had campaigns that
were both for and against consolidation. The outcome of the
campai gn reveals that a professional campaign is not as important to success as a clear and definite accelerator. The result confirms Rosenbaum and Kammerer 's interpretation of Chalmers
Johnson 's theory of revolutionary change. It also provides evidence that although the extension of the Rosenbaum and Kammerer framework to include a professionally run campaign may
illuminat e the reasons for a consolidation attempt , the original
model is robust in predicting radical change in local governance
through referendum .
Rosenbaum and Kammerer 's framework , thus , gives us
not only those elements that are necessary for a successful attempt at a consolidation, but also those elements that lead to failure. For consolidation entrepreneurs who view consol idation as a
means to change the structure of the government or to dislodge
the "old guard," this may come as a warning . Consolidation is a
radical change in the way government is structured and functions
(Marando 1979). If there is no overarching perception of true
disinfatuation with the present government , the local citizens
may opt for the status quo, believing perhaps that something
other than complete restructuring of the government may solve
the problem.
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CONCLUSIONS AND FuTURE DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH

Our study provides new insights into the application of
Rosenbaum and Kammerer 's theory and revolutionary change in
local governance . The extension of the case studies to include
two of Tallahassee 's attempts at consolidation provides additional evidence supporting the original Rosenbaum and Kammerer model.
Since city-county consolidation is a radical change in
governance structures , community attachment and the modes of
citizen problem solving can be critical. William Lyons and David
Lowery (1986, 1989) identified four different responses that citizens have when faced with governmental problems: the exit response, leave and sever the relationship ; the voice response,
actively participate to change the conditions ; the loyalty response , wait for conditions to improve ; and the neglect response,
withdrawal , alienation , and further distrust in the government.
The response of citizens to a crises climate and power deflation
are central to the reorganization process . Can citizens be mobilized to support or oppose the consolidation effort? In Tallahassee, the voter survey reported three equally divided segments of
the population : a pro-consolidation
segment , an anticonsolidation segment , and a segment that preferred to "wait and
see." If the opposition can launch a strong campaign and the proconsolidation camp cannot mobilize grass roots support , even the
support of the elites cannot guarantee success . For revolutionary
change to occur, an accelerator must be present focusing attention on governance problems and mobilizing support for change.
Our work suggests several ways that Rosenbaum and
Kammerer 's theory could be expanded . Elements of internal
threats and external threats to local areas need to be identified.
One avenue for expansion of the model is consideration of the
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role of consolidation entrepreneurs in city/county consolidation
efforts. Under what conditions is the support of civic and other
elites important? Does it matter which elites enter, initiate, and
support the process?
Consolidation entrepreneurs from different arenas can be
important in the consolidation effort. Political , civic, and academic leadership can provide the stimulus to introduce the consolidation as an alternative in the reform effort in the power
deflati on. Their support can also provide a sustaining catalyst
throug h the acceleration and the driving force in a campaign. We
need to identify community elites that act as consolidation entreprene urs and the interactions between these elite individuals and
groups. Chalmers Johnson 's theory ofrevolutionary change and
Rose nbaum and Kammerer 's extension of his approach to local
government reform both stress the importance of the accelerating
event. It is unclear whether these consolidation entrepreneurs on
their own can create an accelerator.
Another important question that could prove difficult to
addres s was raised in a public hearing in Tallahassee in 1973: do
voters support or oppose consolidation as a concept or is support
or opposition based only on the proposed consolidation charter?
If we take the approach of Steven Maser (1985 , 1998) that the
muni cipal charter is a constitutional contract by the government
with the citizens of the municipality, then we could explore the
chang e of structure as an institutional change in the constitution.
While this question has not been addressed, its answer may
prove critical to our understanding of revolutionary change in
metr opolitan government.

VOL. 271999

48

JOHNSON AND FEIOCK
REFERENCES

Bish, Robert L. and Vincent Ostrom. 1973. Understanding Urban Government : Metropolitan Reform Reconsidered. Domestic Affairs Study 20. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise
Institute for Public Policy Research.
Boyles, Hallie. 1972. "Quick Decision Sought: Ford Urges Consolidation." Tallahassee Democrat . 10 Mar. 1972.
Bruns, Dave. 1990. "Lawson Pushes Merger: Three Steps Would Lead
to Consolidation." Tallahassee Democrat . 31 Jan. 1990.
Carson, Dale. 1973. "Consolidation Ends Fragmentation of Law Enforcement." Tallahassee Democrat . 23 October 1973.
Consolidation '73 Committee. 1973. Consolidation News . Vol. 1 (2):
Fall 1973.
Dickens, Jamaine A. 1997. "Merger Issue Too Hot to Handle in Less
than Two Weeks the Thought of Consolidation of the Sheriffs
and Police Departments is Seemingly Being Put to DeathAgain." Tallahassee Democrat . 3 Aug. 1997.
Feiock, Richard C. and Jered B. Carr. 1999. "Private Incentives and
Public Entrepreneurs: The Promotion of City/County Consolidation." Public Administration Quarterly. Forthcoming.
Fineout, Gary. 1991a. "They Fear Not Getting Money's Worth." Tallahassee Democrat . 20 Nov., 1991.
Fineout, Gary. 1991b. "Poll Shows Support for Consolidation" Tallahassee Democrat . 20 Nov., 1991.
THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIEN CE

RE VOLUTIONARY CHANGE IN LO CAL GOVERNANCE

49

Fineout, Gary. 1991c. "Woodville Says Bigger Isn't Better." Tallahassee Democrat . 15 Nov, 1991.
Fineout, Gary. 1991d. "Partisanship Issue Splits Commission." Tallahass ee Democrat . 19 April, 1991.
Fineout, Gary. 1990a. " In High Turnout, Voters OK Consolidation
Commission." Tallahassee Democrat . 7 November, 1990.
Fineout, Gary. 1990b. "Lawson Plan Prompts More Debate: Legislators
support Consolidation." Tallahassee Democrat. 2 February,
1990.
Harbolt, Pat. 1973. "Voters Reject Merger Proposal; Low Turnout
Blamed for Defeat." Tallahassee Democrat . 7 Nov. 1973.
Harbolt, Pat. 1972. "Merger Aid to$$ Ills." Tallahassee Democrat . 11
May 1972.
Jackson, Penrose B. James J. Flannery, and Fred Bair, Jr. 1955. The
Problem of Government in Leon County. Studies in Government No. 14. Bureau of Governmental Research and Service.
School of Public Administration. Tallahassee, FL: Florida
State University.
Johnson, Chalmers. 1966. Revolutiona ry Change. Boston, MA: Little,
Brown, and Company.
Jolley, Tom . 1973(a). "Anti-Merger Forces Blast the Democrat, TV."
Tallahassee Democrat. 9 Feb. 1973.
Jolley, Tom . 1973(b). "Anti-consolidation Forces Plan Avenues for
Attack." Tallahassee Democrat. 28 Jan 1973.
VOL.

271999

50

JOHNSO N AND FEIOCK

Krefetz, Sharon and Alan Sharaf. 1977. "City-County Merger Attempts: The Role of Political Factors." National Civic Review .
Vol. 66 (4): 175-181.
Knott, Jack H. and Gary J. Miller. 1987. Reforming Bureaucrac y: The
Politics of Institutional Choice. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Leonard, Margaret. 1992. "County Says Farewell to Consolidation."
Tallahassee Democrat. 4 November 1992.
Leonard, Margaret. 1991a. "Plan Hits Incumbents Hard." Tallahassee
Democrat. 1 October 1991.
Leonard, Margaret. 1991b. "Marriage of Convenience - or a Hostile
Takeover?: Want a Charter? Expect Some Compromises."
Tallahassee Democrat . 19 August 1991.
Lyons, W. E. and David Lowery. 1989. "Citizen Responses to Dissatisfaction in Urban Communities: A Partial Test of a General
Model." Journal of Politics. 51:841-868.
Lyons, W. E. and David Lowery. 1986. "The Organization of Political
Space and Citizen Responses to Dissatisfaction in Urban
Communities: an Integrative Model." Journal of Politics .
48:321-346.
Martin, Roscoe C. 1963. "Action in Metropolis: I." National Civic Review. 52(6):302-307, 316.
Maser, Steven M. 1998. "Constitutions as Relational Contracts: Explaining Procedural Safeguards in Municipal Charters." Journal of Public Administrat ion Research and Theory. 8:527-564.

THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

RE VOLUTIONARY CHANGE IN LOCAL GOVERNANCE

51

Maser, Steven M. 1985. "Demographic Factors Affecting Constitutional Decisions: The Case of Municipal Charters." Public
Choice. 47 :121-162.
Mastron, Bruce. 1986. "Consolidation Certain to Return, Officials
Say." Tallahassee Democrat . 12 May 1986.
Messinger, Boyd R. 1989. Local Government Restructuring : A test of
the Rosenbaum-Kammerer Theory. Ph.D. diss. University of
Pittsburgh.
Marando, Vincent L. 1979. "City-County Consolidation: Reform, Regionalism, and Requiem." Western Political Quarterly.
32:409-421.
National Commission on Urban Problems. 1968. Building the American City: Report of the National Commission on Urban Prob lems to the Congress and the President of the United States .
91st Congress, 1st Session. House Document No. 91-34.
Washington, D.C.: USGPO.
North Florida Chapter of the American Society for Public Administration. 1991. Statement of the Special Committee for the Study of
the Consolidation of the City of Tallahassee and Leon County.
May 25, 1991. Tallahassee, FL: North FL Chapter, ASPA.
North, Douglass C. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Oppenheim Research. 1991. The Case Study : Consumer Assessment
Survey and Evaluation: Tallahassee - Fall 199 ]-Consolidation. Tallahassee, FL: Oppenheim Research.

VOL.271999

52

JOHNSO N AND FEIOCK

Peck, Dana. 1991a. "Grand Jury Deplores Competition Between LawEnforcement Agencies. " Tallahassee Democrat. 22 Nov
1991: IA .
Peck, Dana. 1991b. "Grand Jury is Back in Action, Looking at Law
Enforcement." Tallahassee Democrat . 19 Nov 1991: IA.
Peck, Dana. 1991c. "Governor Reverses Field, Backs Grand-Jury
Probe." Tallahassee Democrat. 2 Nov 1991: 1-2C.
Rosenbaum, Walter A. and Gladys M. Kammerer. 1974. Against Long
Odds: The Theory and Practice of Successful Governmental
Consolidation. Administrative and Policy Studies Series. Series no. 03-022. Vol. 2. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications
LTD .
Schluckebier, Jack M. 1995. A Study of the 1992 Consolidation Charter Proposal for Tallahassee and Leon County. Ph.D. diss.
Florida State University.
Sherer, Ed. 1971. "Big Turnout Beats Consolidation: But it Might Return Again." Tallahassee Democrat . 2 Nov. 1971.
Spillan, Trisha. 1973. "Merger Meeting Heated; A Straw Ballot Suggested." Tallahassee Democrat. 2 Feb. 1973.
Tallahassee Democrat . 1992. "A Letter to Leon County Voters." 1 Nov
1992.
Tallahassee Democrat . 1991. "A Text of the Grand Jury's Report." 22
Nov . 1991.
Tallahassee Democrat . 1973. "Local Lawyers Debate Cost of Consolidation." 13 June 1973.
Tallahassee Democrat . 1972. "Elected Sheriff Favored in Leon Straw
Vote." 8 November 1972.

THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

